• ESCAPADE telemetry

    Back in November, I posted about the ESCAPADE Mars twin orbiter mission. I made a recording of the X-band telemetry with the Allen Telescope Array the day after launch, and I decoded the telemetry with GNU Radio. I made a preliminary analysis of the telemetry, showing that it contained a large number of log messages in ASCII. Shortly after writing this post, PistonMiner provided a deeper analysis of the telemetry, including a Github repository with some code and extracted data. She noticed that the CCSDS Space Packets, all of which belonged to the same APID 51, contained MAX simple telemetry frames in their payloads. Since MAX telemetry frames contain their own APIDs, this allowed separating the different types of telemetry data. Since seeing this, I wanted to go back and analyse again the telemetry to see what else I could find. Now I’ve finally had some time to do this. In this post I describe my new findings, as well as what PistonMiner originally discovered.

  • Tooling for CSP

    CSP is the Cubesat Space Protocol. It is a network protocol that was developed by Aalborg university, and is commonly used in cubesats, in particular those using GOMspace hardware. Initially the protocol allowed different nodes on a satellite to exchange packets over a CAN bus, but eventually it grew into a protocol that spans a network composed by nodes in the satellite and the groundstation that communicate over different physical layers, including RF links.

    Recently I have been working on a project that involves CSP. To measure network performance and debug network issues, I have written some tooling in Rust, as well as a Wireshark dissector in Lua. The Rust tooling is an implementation from scratch and doesn’t use libcsp. Now I have open sourced these tools in a csp-tools repository and csp-tools Rust crate. In this post I showcase how the tools work.

  • V16 beacon full uplink conversation

    In my previous post I decoded a transmission from a V16 beacon. The V16 beacon has mandatorily replaced warning triangles in Spain in 2026. It is a device that contains a strobe light and an NB-IoT modem that sends its GNSS geolocation using the cellular network. It is said that the beacon first transmits is geolocation 100 seconds after it has been powered on, and then it transmits it again every 100 seconds. In that post I recorded one of those transmissions done after the beacon had been powered on for a few minutes and I decoded it by hand. I showed that the transmission contains a control plane service request NAS message that embeds a 158 byte encrypted message, which is what presumably contains the geolocation and other beacon data.

    In that post I couldn’t show how the beacon connects to the cellular network and sets up the EPS security context used to encrypt the message, since that would have happened some minutes before I made the recording. I have now made a recording that contains both the NB-IoT uplink and the corresponding NB-IoT downlink and starts before the V16 beacon is switched on. In this post I show the contents of the uplink recording.

  • Decoding a V16 beacon

    The V16 beacon is a car warning beacon that will mandatorily replace the warning triangles in Spain starting in 2026. In the event of an emergency, this beacon can be magnetically attached to the roof of the car and switched on. It has a bright LED strobe light and a connection to the cellular network, which it uses to send its GNSS position to the DGT 3.0 cloud network (for readers outside of Spain, the Spanish DGT is roughly the equivalent of the US DMV). The main point of these beacons is that placing warning triangles far enough from a vehicle can be dangerous, while this beacon can be placed without leaving the car.

    There has been some criticism surrounding the V16 beacons and their mandatory usage that will start in January 2026, both for economical and implantation roadmap reasons, and also for purely technical reasons. The strobe light is so bright that you shouldn’t look at it directly while standing next to the beacon (which makes it tricky to pick it up and switch it off), but I have heard that it is not so easy to see in daylight from several hundreds of meters away.

    The GNSS geolocation and cellular network service is also somewhat questionable. I purchased a V16 beacon from the brand NK connected (certificate number LCOE 2024070678G1), for no reason other than the fact that it was sold in a common supermarket chain. The instructions in the box directed me to the website validatuv16.com for testing it. In this website you can register the serial number or IMEI of your beacon and your email. Then you switch on the beacon. After 100 seconds the beacon should send a message to the DGT network, and then periodically every 100 seconds. This test service is somehow subscribed to the DGT network, and it sends you an email that contains the message data (GNSS position and battery status) when the DGT network receives it. This is great, but there is no test mode or anything that declares that you are using the beacon just for testing purposes. They only say that you should not leave the beacon on for much longer than what it takes you to receive the email, to avoid the test being mistaken for a real emergency. The fact that the test procedure for this system is literally the same as the emergency procedure is a red flag for me. Additionally, this beacon only includes cellular data service for 12 years, and it is not clear what happens after that.

    Technical shortcomings aside, my main interest is how the RF connection to the DGT network works. The beacon I bought has a logo in the box saying that it uses the Orange cellular network. When I tested it, after receiving the confirmation email from the test service, I used a Pluto SDR running Maia SDR and quickly found that the beacon was transmitting NB-IoT on 832.3 MHz. I made a recording of one of the periodic transmissions. In this post I analyse and decode the recording.

  • Notes on debugging Rust microcontroller stack usage

    A few days ago I was doing some refactoring of my galileo-osnma project. This is a Rust library that implements the Galileo OSNMA (open service navigation message authentication) system. The library includes a demo that runs in a Longan nano GD32VF103 RISC-V microcontroller board. The purpose of this demo is to show that this library can run on small microcontrollers. My refactoring was in principle a simple thing: I was mainly organizing the repository as a Cargo workspace, and unifying the library and some supporting tools into the same crate. However, after the refactor, users reported that the Longan nano software was broken. It would hang after processing some messages. This post is a collection of notes about how I investigated the issue, which turned out to be related to stack usage.


5g 10ghz artemis1 astronomy astrophotography ATA ccsds ce5 contests digital modes doppler dslwp dsp eshail2 fec freedv frequency gmat gnss gnuradio gomx hermeslite hf jt lilacsat limesdr linrad lte microwaves mods moonbounce noise ofdm orbital dynamics outernet polarization radar radioastronomy radiosonde rust satellites sdr signal generators tianwen vhf & uhf